According to most historians, the Gleiwitz Incident is the “false flag” that touched off World War II in Europe. Put simply, it was the Nazis’ casus belli “heard ‘round the world.” This is what most of us accept as true. The reality is far simpler and less exciting, however…
Nothing unusual happened at the Gleiwitz transmitter station in Germany near the Polish border on the night/early morning of 31 August. There was certainly no false-flag event initiated by SS or SD troops there. However, a few vexing questions remain unanswered. I will ask and try to answer a few right now, and then I will ask and offer a few more alternative answers later on as we proceed through the sordid details.
Before I proceed, a brief word about the White Book. The German White Book (Das Deutsche Weißbuch) was one of several official records produced and kept by the German government. In fact, the White Book concept dates back to World War I. It contains reports, memos, etc. of German officials, such as Joachim von Ribbentrop, in support of the German government and its agenda. The White Book we are concerned with in this case was produced by the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office).
Incidentally, Ernst Heinrich Freiherr von Weizsäcker, a traitor and anti-Hitler conspirator, served as State Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1938 to 1943. Together with Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and General Ludwig Beck, Mr. Weizsäcker was a leader of the “anti-war” group in the German government. The relevance of these details will become clear as we proceed, since Weizsäcker and Canaris may have originated and/or fabricated the ‘Gleiwitz Incident’ report as documented in the White Book. In the light of the evidence I have researched, this is the most compelling circumstantial case thus far.
Firstly, we do not know who the source for the official White Book report is for this purported event. There is an entry in the White Book for 31 August 1939 which is attributed to the police president of Gleiwitz. There is a problem with this, however. The police president at the time was a certain Mr. Schade, and he was murdered in a postwar Polish camp after his IMT (International Military Tribunal) interrogation in 1945. He was never cross-examined during the trial, so his testimony to confirm that he is the actual source will not be had. It is possible that this man was in cahoots with the SS men who appeared at the transmitter station to conduct a brief (and seemingly innocent) radio exercise over the weather channel and who then promptly left. (More about them later). Did Mr. Schade (have to) take a vow of silence in this regard? If this is the case, then the report as well as the broadcast about a supposed “shootout and fatal wounding” at the station were SS fabrications. In any case, they were bogus. Nothing happened and the fake report was planted to deceitfully implicate Poland in a scuffle and fatal shootout at the station, an event and death which never happened but which the Allies claimed did happen. Put simply, this was a fictitious report and broadcast that ultimately backfired on the SS and was in fact used against them with all kinds of lurid details added post facto by the Allies. This is a possible explanation. But there is another possible explanation. What if these SS men were not actually SS men, but imposters with fake credentials? Without Schade’s honest account, we will likely never know if either of these explanations is correct.
Secondly, we do not know the source for the presumably live broadcast from nearby Breslau supporting the claim that the station was in Polish hands and that some sort of commotion was happening there at 20:00 hours. There was a Breslau broadcast in this regard because Captain Otto Radek, whom we will revisit later on, and a few other “earwitnesses” heard the broadcast. They got all excited about it since there were reportedly numerous such separate border shootouts/events that took place that night—none of which Hitler mentioned by name in his “infamous” war-proclamation speech the following day. At any rate, unless the “few SS men” were responsible for this broadcast and the station personnel on duty that night were in cahoots with them to keep quiet about it, then they cannot be the source for this broadcast. All we know is that eyewitnesses at the station, including Radek’s own subordinates with whom he spoke that night, testified that “a few SS men” showed up and conducted a radio exercise there at the station and then promptly left. There was no shooting, no disturbance, nothing. All was quiet, they asserted. If this is the case, then these SS men were innocent of creating a fictitious commotion and broadcast, and some other source is responsible. The questions to ask given this scenario are who was it and how was it done? We may never be able to answer these questions, but they must be asked since we do not have sufficient answers.
There is one other problem I must mention up front. Unlike the SS, the Grenzpolizei is mentioned by name in the White Book entry regarding the Gleiwitz transmitter station. It turns out that the Grenzpolizei worked intimately with Admiral Wilhelm Canaris’s Abwehr (German Military Intelligence Service) on sabotage missions against Poland prior to the outbreak of war. The significance of this oft-overlooked detail will become clear as we delve into the details of the incident at Mosty.
One can see how and why the official record is so convoluted. The official narrative actually consists of many conflicting narratives featuring a whole range of improbable characters. We won’t get into all the details here, but suffice it to say that the official story is nothing more than fanciful fiction. And poorly written fiction at that!
Let us briefly examine just a few details to unscramble this mess as best as possible. Historians overwhelmingly accept as true, as do most people who know of this “incident,” that the SS, SD and Gestapo worked together to concoct an elaborate fake raid on the radio-transmitter station located in Gleiwitz (now known as Gliwice), a small border town located on the Polish-German frontier. By most accounts, a handful of either SS or SD men—historians are unable to agree on which—purportedly dressed up as “Polish soldiers” or “insurgents” and staged a shootout at the transmitter station. This shootout was purportedly led by the notorious Nazi turncoat Alfred Naujocks, the sole source behind the Nuremberg account of the raid. These SS and/or SD men were supposed to have left a body—only recently identified as a Polish citizen of German descent named Franz Honiok (minus any proof)—at the scene as evidence that much more than just a scuffle took place there. However, some historians, such as Dennis Whitehead, seem to think that the SS/SD shot and killed a few of their own men to make the whole thing seem real, and that in fact hundreds of men took place in this whole covert operation (300, to be exact)—which includes two other “false-flag” raids at Hohenlinden or Hochlinden (henceforth, H/H; historians cannot agree on which location it was) and Pitschen. In a nutshell, Mr. Whitehead merged several contradictory versions of the Gleiwitz Incident in an attempt to sell the entire “Nazi false-flag” story as legit. He failed in his mission because two (or more) fictional accounts are no better than one. My own research into this incident, and the other two purported false flags at H/H and Pitschen, proves that not a single one of these historians’ claims is verified. Not a single one.
As it stands, the Gleiwitz Nazi “false-flag” incident is nothing more than a hoax. It is a media fabrication that may have originated with (and/or been expanded upon by) the traitorous Wilhelm Canaris and Co. residing safely behind the security of the much-respected Abwehr, abetted by fellow traitors such as General Halder, Erwin Lahousen, Herbert Mehlhorn, Hans Oster, and a handful of other traitors and sellouts during and after the war. I say this with relative confidence because the official account of what happened at Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen is nearly identical to the real story of the incident at Mosty. I will recount this incident now, minus the fine details.
Wilhelm Canaris’s Abwehr SO- and KO-Groups were entrusted to destroy or secure certain strategic points behind enemy lines prior to Germany’s official invasion of Poland. At the last minute, and much to Canaris’s chagrin if his surviving colleagues are to be believed, Hitler called off the invasion awaiting an answer from Italy concerning support for his Polish endeavor. Canaris’s Abwehr men had to scramble back out of Poland and retreat to Slovakia pending further notice from above. One of Canaris’s men was caught (Josef Kulik), however, and an official inquiry was conducted by Polish military authorities as to why this German was cavorting about in their territory. He was able to assuage the Poles by feigning to have gotten lost and confused as to the border demarcations between Poland and Slovakia, and after a brief interrogation and investigation he was apparently released. This is so uncannily similar to how the story of Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen is told by Mr. Whitehead and other historians that one is impelled to take a second look and to compare them. Upon doing this, I have concluded that the Gleiwitz/H/H/Pitschen macro-incident is nothing more than a tall tale modeled on the real incident at Mosty, perhaps to clear the name of Canaris and the reputation of the Abwehr, instead indicting and condemning specifically “Nazi” state organs (SS, SD and Gestapo). In other words, the Gleiwitz White Book report may be a case of cover (for the Abwehr) and projection (onto the Nazis). (I explain in my two-volume book a range of possible Allied motives for doing this.) If correct, this may explain why “Abwehr” and “Grenzpolizei” are both mentioned in that White Book entry and why zero references to the SS, SD or Gestapo are present in that same entry. There is zero doubt that Abwehr traitors and fellow travelers expanded upon the fictitious incident with wild and lurid details implicating every Nazi organ they possibly could during and after the war, most notably during the IMT. This is beyond any doubt. But, moving along here, also curiously missing from this entry is Captain Otto Radek and 3rd Company of Border Guard Battalion 1/68. He and his border guard, not the border/frontier police or anyone else, were in charge of station security that evening. Thus, when Capt. Radek heard some sort of commotion at the station via the nightly Breslau broadcast, he was taken aback and immediately made for the station via motorcar. To his complete surprise, all was quiet upon his arrival and his fellow guardsmen reported that nothing had happened there. The traitorous Abwehr appears to be the missing link that makes sense amidst all the conflicting information surrounding this entry and the purported “Nazi false flag” at Gleiwitz, which I thoroughly explain and explore in my two books. One has to read both books to piece the entire case against the Abwehr and other traitors together, as there are many layers to this rotten onion.
In this instance, “Abwehr” is an inapposite term to use in this entry seeing as how Die Abwehr was the name of Germany’s military intelligence service at the time. We are expected to accept without question that no other term was appropriate in this entry and context. It just strikes me as odd. And again, this particular entry is attributed to none other than Police President W. Schade, a man murdered not by Nazis but, as I will address again later, by Poles in a postwar concentration camp in 1945. After the war, when Capt. Radek attempted to properly investigate what did take place at the station that night, if anything, his efforts were thwarted in interesting ways. It seems obvious who was silencing whom here.
Permit me to further speculate about the transmitter entry as a possible Abwehr/Grenzpolizei fake. The source for the White Book entry must also have been the source (or was in close touch with the source) for the Gleiwitz incident news stories/reports put out by the DNB (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro) and the Völkischer Beobachter (VB). Whoever that source was, it seems to me, was trying to make the Nazi press look bad. And it is a fact that several Abwehr traitors along with their allies were working to subvert Hitler since 1937, especially regarding his diplomacy concerning Poland. Maybe said source planted this White Book entry knowing that not only the Nazi press but the Allied press too would pick up on it and use it against Germany (i.e., that Hitler had “started the war with a lie”). In other words, maybe the Allied press was tipped off about this purported “incident” (along with the two others at H/H and Pitschen, which the British press also reported on) and subsequent White Book report, and so they could utilize it how they wanted against Germany. Indeed, the British press had reported on these incidents (Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen) before they were even completed! As well, both the DNB and VB agencies reported an incident at Gleiwitz featuring contradictory details to those of the White Book and to those of the Allied versions (including that of Mr. Naujocks).
Let’s move on.
Deeper research into the purported Gleiwitz Incident indicates that nothing happened at the transmitter station aside from the brief SS radio exercise/test. There was no commotion, no shootout and no fake Polish soldiers or ruffians. The Gleiwitz hoax was laid to rest for the remainder of the war. Even most mainstream historians refer to it as “forgotten,” “little known” or “insignificant.” However, it was resurrected for the IMT to indict the Nazis in particular as the sole guilty party for the outbreak of war with Poland, and all by most murderous and deceitful means! Germany had to look bad. Because, as we all know, the USSR really was bad. The worst kind of bad. And Britain was bad too. The British leadership, notably Sir Winston Churchill, was very interested in war breaking out on the Continent to the benefit of the Empire’s longstanding “Divide and Conquer” strategy. Somehow the Nazis had to look worse than everyone else.
The spotlight of condemnation had to remain on Germany. Touching off the world’s worst war by needless murder and clandestine trickery was the perfect indictment of an otherwise honorable nation. Throughout the IMT, it only got worse for Germany. Indeed, this Gleiwitz incident set the stage for the entire Allied casus belli against Germany. Germany, and Germany alone, was the sole culprit for the outbreak of war. By any means necessary. I would also venture to guess that the incident at Venlo, during which the Germans seized two English SIS spies just across the Dutch border, had something to do with the resurrection of the Gleiwitz hoax for the IMT.
The Gleiwitz fiasco is best known to historians and the public as either Operation Himmler or Operation Tannenberg. Yes, you read that right folks! Historians cannot even agree on the name of this “false flag” without which Hitler had no just cause for war against Poland. Had so many lives not been lost in that conflagration, and had not so much needless guilt and personal smearing been meted out against otherwise innocent parties and persons, this whole thing would be comical.
I must digress for just a moment and recap because the following two points need to be appreciated fully. First, qualified historians cannot even agree on what this “false flag” operation was called. Yet, without this operation (and the two others that supposedly went along with it at H/H and Pitschen), (we are told that) Hitler couldn’t even hope to sell his invasion of Poland to the German people as legit, let alone to the world. It was, per the official historical record, his “casus belli”. Secondly, historians cannot decide if it was the Gestapo, SS or SD, or all three(!), that led the three purported border raids, nor how many men were involved in each. The official narratives are a shambles. Really, these two points alone establish the untenability of the official historical record regarding Gleiwitz. And if the record is this problematic, why should Germans (then or now) bear any guilt in this regard? This is in fact why the truth about what did and did not happen at the Gleiwitz transmitter station is so important to determine. Germans have been bearing needless guilt and shame regarding this aspect of World War II. I believe historian Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof has called it “the war that had MANY fathers,” not just one father. Moreover, as with Lord Dacre’s Table Talk, which Dr. Richard Carrier has again blasted as essentially worthless as a record of Hitler’s utterings, real Third Reich history (Real3R) has been eluding the public for decades. It is high past time to set the entire World War II record straight.
In a nutshell, my tentative conclusion about Gleiwitz is as follows:
The German White Book ‘Gleiwitz Incident’ entry of 31 August 1939 originates with 1) Abwehr/Grenzpolizei traitors, or 2) Police President W. Schade. Since Herr Schade was conveniently murdered in a postwar Polish concentration camp in 1945, as aforesaid, he is not the likeliest suspect. Unfortunately, Canaris was killed by the Nazi state for his long-time duplicity, so there will likely never be a sure way to confirm who, precisely, originated this official report. Suffice it to say that in the light of all the evidence, or lack thereof, as well as the Mosty Incident, which implicates the Abwehr, Grenzpolizei and Canaris in provable ‘war crimes’ as well as in regard to violation of Poland’s sovereignty when war was not yet on, the Abwehr, Grenzpolizei and Canaris are the likeliest suspects. I hardly need mention that Hitler called the war off on 25 August, so if he was going to utilize alleged “false flag” raids at Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen as his reason(s) for war, why would all three “false flags” only be planned for (and actually take place on) 31 August and not also on the evening/early morning of 24/25 August as with Mosty? Talk about playing with fire! Please recall that the invasion took place on 1 September, not on 26 August as originally planned. It was not until recently that the official narrative tried to mitigate this blatant error. Every single account has asserted that all three “raids” took place on the evening/early morning of 31 August. Moreover, why did Hitler neglect to mention a single one of these most-coveted of false-flag events by name in his declaration of war speech the next day? That’s a huge problem that not a single historian has addressed. Until now, of course.
I will now ask a couple more vexing questions, which I explore in my two-book set.
The Allied press, specifically in Britain and the US, as well as the Völkischer Beobachter (official NSDAP newspaper) and the DNB (semi-official news agency with Allied connections and employees) put out conflicting and disputable versions of the alleged incident.
Who delivered the Breslau broadcast about what reportedly happened at the Gleiwitz transmitter station? Was it a traitor? An Allied mole?
Let’s ponder these possibilities for a moment.
A traitor or mole would be motivated to sabotage Hitler’s war effort and/or to undermine his credibility and/or honorable conduct. This was in fact one of the earliest goals of the traitors in the Abwehr (their collective sabotage of Hitler’s diplomatic efforts commenced in 1937).
The Allied press reported soon after Hitler’s invasion of Poland in 1939 that he had “started the war with a lie.” Who fed the Allied press this line? That “lie” consisted of the “false flags” perpetrated by the instruments of the NSDAP itself (Gestapo, SS and SD) at Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen. However, not one of these “false flags” has any evidence to support it.
Revisionist historian Carlos W. Porter mentions a “posh Polish-bank branch” near the border which did “very little business.” It was allowed to exist and operate with the German authorities’ permission. Oddly, it disappeared right around the time of the purported Gleiwitz “false flag.” Did any of these folks have British and/or Abwehr/Grenzpolizei traitor connections or contacts? If so, might their involvement in this “false-flag” hoax (at the time) explain the murder of Gleiwitz transmitter station manager Klose (murdered by partisans in 1945) as well as the murder of Gleiwitz police president Schade? If this Polish-bank branch was involved at any level in this “false-flag” hoax, then my hypothesis accounts for both its existence and sudden disappearance, something that has thus far eluded historians. Perhaps the Abwehr and/or Grenzpolizei had something to do with it.
In any event, why was this “false-flag” hoax resurrected after the war, and why did it receive so much attention during the IMT and after the war as it pertains to the Allied narrative? (See accompanying appendix of actual IMT testimony.) Remember, it was “insignificant” and “little known” at the time (even though it was supposed to be Hitler’s casus belli Number One). One sensible explanation is that the Abwehr’s traitorous agents—e.g., Erwin Lahousen and Wilhelm Canaris in absentia—as well as SD/SS turncoats, such as Alfred Naujocks (who defected to the Allies toward the end of the war) and even Heinrich Himmler’s adjutant Karl Wolff, were needed as star witnesses for the prosecution (and later on for the Cold War as American agents). As such, these people’s ‘war crimes’ and the Abwehr’s ‘war crimes’ at Mosty et. al were simply dismissed or apparently attributed to dead men and/or the SS, SD and Gestapo via Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen.
The Abwehr’s and these other traitors’ suspected role in concocting these “false-flag” reports and stories—either at the time (in 1939) or later on during the IMT, or in postwar memoirs and magazine interviews like the one featuring Herbert Mehlhorn in Stern in 1952—seems undeniable. The purported “false flags” at Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen mirrored their own sabotage missions in Poland nearly to a tee. That’s uncanny. Not to mention Alfred Naujocks’s two missions against Formis and the SIS agents resemble the Gleiwitz scene enough to render Gleiwitz a fictional knock-off.
Lastly, we must ask why Alfred Naujocks’s IMT affidavits mention only two “false flag” sites (Gleiwitz and Hohenlinden) while the IMT and postwar accounts of other suspected actors in this hoax (e.g., Lahousen and Mehlhorn) mention three sites, one of which is incorrect (Hochlinden)? Is this because the IMT “evidence” and postwar “history” had to match Hitler’s actual 1 September proclamation, wherein he casually mentioned three sites and not just two? It sure makes one wonder, especially since Hitler failed to name them specifically. Indeed, he failed to exploit any of them as his casus belli. Instead, he and Dr. Goebbels’s propaganda machine exploited the Bromberg Massacre (which took place two days after the invasion on 3 September) and other alleged Polish atrocities and persecutions against German minorities residing in Poland. Just check out the book Die polnischen Greueltaten an den Volksdeutschen in Polen: Im Auftrage des Auswärtigen Amtes auf Grund urkundlichen Beweismaterials zusammengestellt, bearbeitet und herausgegeben. What’s more, the British already knew Hitler’s real casus belli, which is featured in the secret Whitehall Report.
I must admit, the Allies were clever. But they were also sloppy. They were equally sloppy regarding the Crystal Night “telexes” that they concocted out of whole cloth for the IMT prosecution.
Let’s recap the main points of our inquiry thus far.
The Gleiwitz false flag never took place.
What reportedly did take place was a brief radio exercise or test conducted by a few purported SS men who properly identified themselves to station personnel on duty that night. Since the Gleiwitz station’s weather channel was not intended to broadcast far and wide but only locally (another glaring problem with the official narrative), it was the perfect station to conduct a relatively private test or exercise. (It was also the perfect station to serve as setting for a media hoax.) What these SS men’s motives were for conducting said exercise/test remains unclear. My own research has revealed that communications were cut or failing all along the frontier leading up to the war, so it may be that they were simply interested to see whether the station was still functioning as intended. Perhaps they might need to use it for local communications purposes. It’s hard to say, but nothing untoward happened at that station and there are several witnesses who have attested to that. Those who have contradicted this version of what happened there, or could have contradicted it, are all confirmed traitors and/or IMT prosecution star witnesses. Or, they were murdered or died untimely deaths.
Convenient, isn’t it?
The Gleiwitz false flag is based on a real Abwehr/Grenzpolizei sabotage (“crime against peace”) mission behind Polish lines (i.e., the incident at Mosty).
It should not surprise anyone to learn that all of the surviving “stars” of the Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen stories were Abwehr traitors or SD/SS turncoats. What’s more, many of these same “stars” featured prominently for the IMT prosecution.
What a coincidence, eh?
The Gleiwitz hoax may have originated with Abwehr/Grenzpolizei traitors and was resurrected during the IMT as revenge for the Venlo affair.
After all, it was none other than Mr. Naujocks who successfully pulled off the kidnapping of two British SIS agents, Stevens and Best, by brazenly dashing across the Dutch border and hauling them off by motorcar after a brief scuffle and shootout.. Churchill was furious and had to revamp the entire SIS as a direct result. This affair embarrassed Britain immensely—to be involved in such shenanigans! What’s more, the Dutch had violated their own neutrality by allowing said agents to use their country as a spies’ playground. Hitler exploited this incident for all it was worth, which was quite a lot. It was such a lethal blow to British prestige and fair play that Winston Churchill and his fellow British authorities would have had good reason to use the very man who captured their agents, a man who had caused them so much political pain and international embarrassment, for their IMT casus belli against Germany. That man was none other than Mr. Naujocks.
Hence the resurrection of the Gleiwitz hoax for the IMT featuring Alfred Naujocks as star witness! The IMT scene likely went something like this: “We wrote up these nice affidavits for you, Mr. Naujocks. You sign your name to them and we let you go. Sound good?”
After signing off on the Gleiwitz affidavit (along with two others), Naujocks disappeared—until his strange death in the 1960s. You see, Naujocks was just about to be brought to trial by the West German government for the death of a man at the Gleiwitz transmitter station—because that’s what the official 1961 Gleiwitz movie put out by the communist East German government claimed had happened!!—when he just up and died. Or he disappeared. Historians are not exactly sure which it was. But the craziest thing about that trial is that Naujocks was cleared of all charges (in absentia). The man who was allegedly shot and left for dead at the Gleiwitz station could not be identified. In fact, the prosecution could not establish that a shooting or murder had even taken place there! Yeah, the rabbit hole does go deep on this one.
I could go on and on with the curious details of this incident, but that would defeat the purpose of my two-volume book on this topic. I recommend interested persons read both books in order to know the Gleiwitz incident, and so much more, inside it and out.
Hitler did not utilize the Gleiwitz incident to make his case for war. Uncanny, really, seeing as how it was supposed to have made his case for war with Poland and all. Among the most pressing problems about what purportedly transpired at Gleiwitz, at least as I see it, is that there are countless versions of this most ‘singular’ event. How is this possible since there is only ever one version of the truth?
To my knowledge, there is not a single historian who claims that the purported “false flag” at Gleiwitz was legitimate. Some historians have supported Hitler’s real motives for invading Poland, which are fully fleshed out in my two-volume book set, though said historians are few and far between. Most historians condemn every move Hitler and Germany made because that is what political correctness guides them to do. They are shackled by the official World War II narrative, which must always be anti-Nazi.
Having said that, Time Magazine ran the following story on Monday, 29 May 1939:
“King Alexander of Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou were murdered at Marseille in 1934 by a professional assassin whose Italian connections were carefully hushed. Two years ago British Ambassador to China Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen was machine-gunned and dangerously wounded by a Japanese plane. During the Spanish Civil War “pirate” submarines torpedoed British and French merchantmen. If an incident were needed to start a war, the world has recently had plenty of them.” (emphasis added)
Yes, the world, including Hitler himself, had witnessed many incidents that could rightly have been used as pretexts for war. If this was the case, then why were and are Hitler’s reasons considered “unjust”? The fact of the matter is that Hitler did not need a raid at the Gleiwitz station to justify invading Poland. In fact, an incident concerning a certain Mr. Gruebner is recognized by the media here as a valid case for war. The Time journalist was in fact wondering whether Hitler would use this man’s murder as his casus belli against Poland.
The Time article went on to report that
“Early this week there was another, this one at Kaltof in highly inflammable Danzig. Involved was no highly placed ruler or diplomat, but a German butcher named Gustav Gruebner, who was killed by a shot fired from an official Polish automobile. Since incidents amount to what nations want to make them, Führer Adolf Hitler could give Butcher Gruebner a sure niche in history by deciding that this was just the right kind of provocation he needed to march into Danzig.”
Hmm…I thought that the Gleiwitz raid was “just the sort of incident” Hitler needed? What happened to that?
We then read:
“There are always two versions to diplomatic incidents, and l’affaire Gruebner was no exception. The Polish account: the Polish Vice-Commissioner to Danzig went to Kaltof to investigate the sacking of a Polish customs house by a German mob; his party was attacked, compelling his chauffeur to fire in self-defense. To this the German version bears little resemblance: there was merely an orderly demonstration against ‘molestations’ of German girls by Polish officials, and Gustav Gruebner was plugged for no reason at all. The Nazi-controlled Danzig Government through the Senate President promptly demanded compensation for Butcher Gustav’s bereaved relatives, apologies, and the surrender of the ‘murderer.’ The Poles made counter-demands: punishment of those guilty of the attack on the customs house, compensation for damages and assurances for the protection of Polish interests.”
As we can see, both sides were antagonizing one another, and both sides had legitimate grievances. Germany was no more nor less guilty for touching off World War II than Poland (or Britain, or France, or the US, or the USSR).
As the old saying goes, “it takes two to tango.”
(relevant IMT testimony; all emphasis added)
27 Aug. 46
As a Crime against Peace the SD is accused of having staged so-called border incidents before the outbreak of the war to give Hitler an excuse for starting the war. The Prosecution, however, referred to only one border incident in which the SD is alleged to have participated. That is the alleged attack on the Gleiwitz radio station.
In this connection the Prosecution made reference to the affidavit of Alfred Naujocks of 20 November 1945. This is Prosecution Document 2751-PS. The deponent of Document 2751-PS, Alfred Naujocks, was heard before the Commission. On that occasion he declared that the execution of the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station was not included in the aims and purposes of Amts III and VI.
The witness further testified that no sections of Amts III and VI were used for the execution of that border incident in Gleiwitz and that the men who with him attacked the Gleiwitz station did not belong to the SD, Amt III.
The witness also stated that by the term “SD men” in his affidavit of 20 November 1945 he did not mean the members of any definite office of the RSHA; but common usage of the term “SD men” referred to RSHA members of all offices which were subordinate to Heydrich.
The witness further stated that he was charged with the execution of the border incident at Gleiwitz, not because he belonged to Amt VI and worked there, but that exclusively personal reasons were responsible for that decision. The witness testified that on the basis of the conversation he had had with Heydrich he had gained the impression that Heydrich would have given him that assignment even if he had not been a member of Amt VI and the SS. The order for the execution of this assignment reached the witness Naujocks not through the official channels of the chiefs of Aemter III or VI. The chiefs of Aemter III and VI had no knowledge of this action.
The members of the SD, Amt III and Amt VI, had no knowledge that the attack was carried out by Naujocks, a member of Amt VI. Particularly the members of the SD-Leitabschnitt which was in charge of Gleiwitz, and the outpost of the SD, had no knowledge of this activity and could not have had, because Naujocks had been forbidden to get in touch with any members of the SD whatsoever in that territory.
…I also submitted 215 affidavits for the office of the RSHA as well as for all territories of the SD-Leitabschnitte and the SD-Abschnitte, particularly for those situated in the regions of Katowice, Danzig, and Saxony. Those affidavits testify that the members of the SD during the critical time had no knowledge of the faked border incidents or the participation of the SD in them.
The affidavit by the witness Dr. Mildner (2479-PS) is refuted by the testimony of the witness Naujocks and Affidavit Number SD-11, Dr. Marx. This subject matter does not provide sufficient grounds to declare the SD to have been criminal, since this would presuppose proof of the fact that the SD as an organization was employed in the aggression, and that its members had cognizance thereof. (Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-27-46.asp)
29 Aug. 46
…The Gestapo and SD were likewise involved in the commission of Crimes against Peace. The very incident that served as an excuse for the invasion of Poland, and thus set off the entire war, was executed by the Gestapo and the SD. I refer to the simulated Polish attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. where concentration camp prisoners were dressed in Polish, uniforms, murdered, and left as evidence of a Polish raid, so as to afford Hitler a justification for the attack upon Poland. (Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-29-46.asp)
23 Aug. 46
…In this connection the Indictment makes the charge that the Gestapo, together with the SD, had artificially created border incidents in order to give Hitler a pretext for a war with Poland. Two border incidents are cited, the attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz and a feigned attack by a Polish group at Hohenlinden.
The attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz was not carried out with the participation of Gestapo officials. The witness Naujocks,
who was the leader of this undertaking but did not belong to the Gestapo, has confirmed unequivocally that no member of the Gestapo participated in this action. Instructions for this undertaking emanated directly from Heydrich and were transmitted orally by him directly to Naujocks.
Instructions concerning the feigned attack at Hohenlinden were transmitted by Mueller, the chief of Amt IV of the RSHA, to Naujocks; however, Naujocks, who directed this action, has expressly denied any participation by Amt IV.
DR. MERKEL: I had gone as far as the testimony of the witness Naujocks regarding the attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz and the attack of that group near Hohenlinden. He stated that, quite naturally, it was not one of the tasks of Amt IV of the RSHA to engineer border incidents. Nor did Mueller select members of Amt IV for the purpose of staging the above-mentioned border incident, but only individuals who were in his confidence; for Heydrich did not trust the Gestapo with respect to secrecy and reliability.
Naujocks stated literally: “I cannot identify Mueller with the organization of the Gestapo.” (Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-23-46.asp)
DR. LATERNSER: Did you have knowledge of the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station?
VON RUNDSTEDT: No. (Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-12-46.asp)
DR. FRITZ: Please give us examples of cases wherein you felt you were deceived.
FRITZSCHE: During this Trial the news was discussed which circulated at the beginning of the Polish war about the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station. At that time I firmly believed in the truth of the official German news. I need say nothing about this case. (Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/06-27-46.asp)
20 Dec. 45
“3. I went to Gleiwitz and waited there a fortnight. Then I requested permission of Heydrich to return to Berlin but was told to stay in Gleiwitz. Between the 25th and 31st of August I went to see Heinrich Muller, head of the Gestapo, who was then nearby at Oppeln. In my presence Muller discussed with a man named Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German troops …. Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to be used. Muller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground at the scene of the incident to show that they had been killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the assault members of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared. (Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/12-20-45.asp)
4 April 46
DR. NELTE: You know, of course, that this matter was connected with the subsequent attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. Do you know anything of this incident?
KEITEL: This incident, this action came to my knowledge for the first time here through the testimony of witnesses. I never found out who was charged to carry out such things and I knew nothing of the raid on the radio station at Gleiwitz until I heard the testimonies given here before the Tribunal. Neither do I recall having heard at that time that such an incident had occurred. (Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/04-04-46.asp)
30 Nov. 45
COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal the nature of the assistance required?
LAHOUSEN The affair on which I am now giving testimony is one of the most mysterious actions which took place within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr. A few days, or sometime before – I believe it was the middle of August – the precise date can be found in the diary of the division –Abwehr Division I, as well as my division, Abwehr Division II, were given the task of providing Polish uniforms and equipment such as identification cards and so on, for an Undertaking Himmler. This request, according to an entry in the diary of the division which was kept not by me, but by my adjutant, was received by Canaris from the Wehrmacht Operations Staff or from the National Defense Department. I believe the name of General Warlimont is mentioned.
COL. AMEN: Do you know where this request originated?
LAHOUSEN: Where the request originated I cannot say, I can only say that it reached us in the form of an order. It was, to be sure, an order on which we, the divisional chiefs concerned, already had some misgivings without knowing what, in the last analysis, it meant. The name Himmler, however, spoke for itself, and that is also evident from entries of the diary which record my question why Herr Himmler should come to receive uniforms from us.
COL.AMEN: To whom was the Polish material to be furnished by the Abwehr?
LAHOUSEN: These articles of equipment had to be kept in readiness, and one day some man from the SS or the SD – the name is given in the official war diary of the division – collected them.
COL. AMEN: At what time was the Abwehr informed as to how this Polish material was to be used?
LAHOUSEN: The real purpose was unknown to us then; we do not know its details even today. All of us, however, had the reasonable suspicion that something entirely crooked was being planned; the name of the mission was sufficient indictment for that. (Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/11-30-45.asp)
8 March 46
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And would you care to tell the Tribunal what you know about the fictitious incidents along the Polish border?
BODENSCHATZ: I do not know anything positive. I was asked by Colonel Williams whether I knew in advance about the incident of the Gleiwitz broadcasting section. I told him I knew nothing about it. It was only that the incidents on the Polish border were very similar to those which happened on the Czech border. It may have been presumed – that was only my opinion – that they were perhaps deliberate. But I had no positive proof that anything had been staged on our part. (Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/03-08-46.asp)
1] Please consult the English translation of the relevant reports at http://www.allworldwars.com/German%20White%20Book.html (accessed December 20, 2018).
 I am currently inquiring about the testimony of Mr. Schade and I will publish an update as soon as I have that information. It is possible that Mr. Schade based his report on what he heard from the Breslau broadcast, assuming he did hear it that night and that it contained all the necessary details, but without seeing his testimony I cannot confirm or deny this. We do not know how he got the details for this report. We also do not know exactly what was said in that broadcast. “Earwitnesses” offer conflicting testimony in this regard.
 Cross-examination is when the defense attorney questions the prosecution’s witness(es), in this case Mr. Schade, during a trial. Cross-examination allows the defense to present evidence via witnesses of their choosing.
 See footnote 11.
 Pronounced “Glee-veets-uh”
 During an attempted kidnapping gone sour, Alfred Naujocks accidentally shot and killed Rudolf Formis, the radio technician who was operating an illegal station near Prague in behalf of Hitler’s personal enemy, Otto Strasser. Reinhard Heydrich, his superior at the time, was furious. At Venlo, just across the Dutch border, Mr. Naujocks nearly bungled the kidnapping of two British SIS agents suspected of assisting Georg Elser in the assassination attempt on Hitler at the Bürgerbräukeller—Mr. Stevens and Mr. Best. Since Mr. Naujocks did pull off the mission successfully, he was awarded the Iron Cross by Adolf Hitler.
 See Bob Graham, “World War II’s first victim,” August 29, 2009, The Telegraph on the Web, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-two/6106566/World-War-IIs-first-victim.html (accessed November 28, 2018).
 Most mainstream historians assert that deceased concentration camp inmates (referred to as Heinrich Müller’s “canned goods”) were left at the scene as opposed to just a single man. However, few of these historians agree on the number of bodies purportedly left at the scene; nor does any of these historians support their claims with reliable evidence. They all rely on conjecture and hearsay. See Heinz Höhne’s thesis, for example. (Heinrich Müller was Chief of the Gestapo throughout the war. He disappeared or died in 1945.)
 There are two more possibilities as to the origins of the Gleiwitz report/incident, one of which is that it is an Abwehr/Grenzpolizei fabrication, the other of which it is a Polish-British fabrication. I explore both hypotheses in detail, accompanied by a wide range of evidence, in my two-volume book on the topic. Please see Volumes 1 and 2 of The Gleiwitz Incident: Nazi False Flag or Media Hoax?, which is available directly from me or from Amazon.
 The Abwehr and Grenzpolizei worked intimately together throughout Canaris’s sabotage mission in Poland prior to the outbreak of war (i.e., leading up to the incident at Mosty). Unlike the SS, SD and Gestapo, IMT testimony exonerating these three agencies aside, neither the Abwehr nor the Grenzpolizei was implicated and/or condemned as criminal organizations during the IMT.
 If the SS was trying to be clandestine and circumspect about conducting fake border incidents, then why are they mentioned by name (SS-Verfügungstruppe) in the official White Book entry of 31 August 1939 as Entry #5? Were the Nazis so stupid? Not to mention this border incident happened at Hoflinden, not Hohenlinden or Hochlinden.
 Otto Radek, first lieutenant and later captain in World War I, was instructed to set up the border guard in the Gleiwitz area; he was also appointed commander in charge. Radek was a reserve officer and public-school teacher, an upstanding citizen. Beginning on 24 August 1939 the border guard was deployed in full force; they received live ammunition with the objective to safeguard the region. The Gleiwitz transmitter station was secured by 3rd Company of Border Guard Battalion 1/68.
 Sometime in March 1937, senior Abwehr Officer Paul Thümmel provided much significant information about the German intelligence services to Czech agents who in turn, forwarded the data to SIS London. Thümmel also delivered details about “military capabilities, and intentions” as well as “detailed information on the organization and structure of the Abwehr and SD” along with “the near-complete order of battle of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, and German mobilization plans.” He later provided advance warnings of the German annexation of the Sudetenland as well as the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland.” (See Jeffrey Richelson, Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 85.)
Before Spring 1938 came to an end, the conservative members of the German Foreign Office and many officers in the military had expressed fears about the risks of a European war initiated by Hitler. A conspiratorial group formed around General Erwin von Witzleben and Admiral Canaris as a result. Throughout the process, Canaris and subordinates such as Helmuth Groscurth worked to prevent war. Canaris participated in the plots among the military leadership for a coup against Hitler and attempted to establish covert communication lines with the British. Before the invasion of Poland occurred, the Abwehr went so far as to send a special emissary, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, to London in order to warn them. (See Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), 70–71; Richard Bassett, Hitler’s Spy Chief: The Wilhelm Canaris Betrayal (New York: Pegasus Books, 2011), 147–164; and Gerhard Weinberg, Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II (New York: Enigma Books, 2005), 585.
 The only rival explanation (i.e., the official revisionist explanation) which is not without its own problems is that Polish insurgents operating out of a local bank front (i.e., the “posh Polish-bank branch” as described by Revisionist Carlos Porter) really did attack the station, and this whole thing was covered up by the Allies post facto. The incident was then turned around on the Nazis, hence the need for Alfred Naujocks’s affidavits for the IMT. But this explanation ignores the Mosty parallels completely, and it does not account for who was behind the Breslau broadcast about a shootout and scuffle at the radio transmitter station that certain “earwitnesses” claim to have heard. Of course, not only the shootout and scuffle but the Breslau broadcast in Polish and German could have been conducted by Polish insurgents, but there are conflicting eyewitness/earwitness reports asserting that NOTHING at all happened at the station. No insurgents, no nothing. I explore all possibilities in my books, without committing myself 100% to any single explanation owing to a few unanswerable questions. My hope is that my books will prompt further inquiry and perhaps we will get some definitive answers at last. What I can say with 100% certainty is that the Nazis did not conduct a false flag there or anywhere else on the border that evening/early morning.
 Might Mr. Schade have been working with Abwehr/Grenzpolizei subversives/traitors in this regard? Yet another possibility. It would certainly explain why he could not be cross-examined (Abwehr and fellow traitors had to be protected throughout the IMT for the prosecution’s sake) and why he had to be murdered by the Allies as quickly as possible, so as not to be further questioned or allowed to talk to the public or write contradictory memoirs post facto. Bear in mind too that the Gleiwitz station manager, Herr Klose, was murdered by partisans in 1945. Odd, no?
 I detail all of this in my books.
 CODOH readers may consult my two-volume set entitled The Gleiwitz Incident: Nazi False Flag or Media Hoax? for those (and many more) details.
 He wrote on his blog, “historians are so annoyed that they don’t have good sources, that they start unconsciously acting like the sources they do have are good. Because, you know, “it’s all we have,” and “we have to work with what we have.” Historians all too often leverage sources with hope rather than fact: a source sucks and is unreliable, but is all they have, so they treat it as authoritative and reliable. This has happened with Hitler’s Table Talk: the vast suspicion that surrounds its reliability is ignored, and it continues to be treated as the verbatim words of Hitler, when in fact it appears actually to be the words of minions recording their recollections of him, and later editors who changed up what they wanted.” See Richard Carrier, “History as a Science,” October 7, 2016, https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/11311 (accessed November 27, 2018).
 Hitler had set the invasion of Poland date as August 26, but on August 25 he called off the attack when he heard that Britain had signed a new treaty with Poland promising military support.
 For much more detail about this Time article and Hitler’s real reasons for war against Poland, please consult my book co-written with J. A. Sexton entitled The Hitler Worship Cult: Distortion, Justification & Mythmaking. We have included countless important details, such as the following: “…the German death figure of about 5,000 blew up into 58,000, and then 300,000 by the time Hitler heard about it…actual conference minutes of Hitler and his generals confirm the thesis that Hitler was willing to use force against Poland as early as March 1939 (five months prior to the alleged ‘anti-German massacres and atrocities’ and the physical invasion in August).”
“This Hitler Worship Cult myth just collapsed. Totally. Poland was not in a position to launch an offensive war against Germany, which is why Hitler used the alleged mass persecution of ethnic Germans in Poland as his public casus belli. He could not sell his war to the German (or world) public otherwise.” (p. 29) Hitler never cited the purported Gleiwitz incident, not privately or publicly.
 Why would Heydrich request Naujocks after he (Naujocks) nearly blew the kidnapping of Stevens and Best at Venlo, and completely blew the mission to kidnap Formis? Naujocks is unreliable. Period.
 But we just read in the afternoon session of 23 August 1946 that “Naujocks stated literally: ‘I cannot identify Mueller with the organization of the Gestapo’.”
 Members of the press and other persons were never taken to the scene of the incident.