The Port Chicago Disaster: Was it a Nuclear Explosion? If so, Was it an Accident or a False Flag Nuclear Test made to Look like an Accident?

STRONG EVIDENCE

There is very strong circumstantial evidence to indicate that a nuclear weapon was aboard one of two ships that blew up at Port Chicago on the evening of Monday, July 17. What makes the evidence so strong, is not only written documentation concerning the blast, but also the itinerary of key people in the nuclear community after the blast. A Los Alamos document that describes the testing of an atomic device – and all its parameters – clearly states in Step 11. “Ball of fire mushroom out at 18,000 ft. in typical Port Chicago fashion.” The Los Alamos document, prepared a short time after the Port Chicago explosion, History of 10,000 Ton Gadget, provides 11 steps of a nuclear explosion: (Though you do not have to understand nuclear physics, follow the steps to the end.)

1. Detonation.
2. Detonation wave reaches temper 18,5 x 2,54 over 7 x 10.
3. Temp and active fully compressed.
4. Neutrons multiply and shock wave hits temper 18/2 x 10.
5. Shock wave passes through H.E. and case to reach air 74/2 x 10.
6. Radiation squirts out, temperature drops and isothermal sphere formed.
7. Strong blast wave expands.
8. Ball of fire fully expands.
9. Blast wave reaches damage area.
10. In a test, blast wave would reach installation and observers at 10,000 yards. Also ball of fire reached height of 2000 ft. and completely disintegrated into turbulent convection currents.
11. Ball of fire mushroom out at 18,000 ft in typical Port Chicago fashion.

The fact that this classified document on the testing of an atomic bomb came from Los Alamos and specifically refers to Port Chicago, is clear evidence of a nuclear device. But that is not all the evidence available.

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

In a classified document dated July 21, 1944 – four days after the Port Chicago explosion – there is more fragile evidence of something out of the ordinary. The District Intelligence Officer wrote confidential memorandum 11-3-16137 to the Commandant Twelfth Naval District. The report states, there were reports “of a shiny black car reported to have been seen at approximately 2130 (hours) at the foot of the pier, but no information was developed to indicate that any unauthorized vehicle of such description was seen to enter or leave the (Port Chicago) Naval Magazine at any time which might reasonably be connected with the explosion.” The vehicle was not a Navy vehicle nor was its business explained, but it did have authorization to be near the pier, suggesting a top secret meeting. Were the occupants of the vehicle from the scientific community? There are possible links we will explore later in this article.

At the same time, the Navy was photographing Port Chicago from across the Bay – a safe distance from the explosion. The Navy captured the Port Chicago explosion on a nitrate-base film. That film was held in the safe of the Concord Naval Weapons Station. The Navy claims that the film was a simulation of the Port Chicago explosion filmed for Hollywood in the 1960s But nitrate-base film has not been produced since prior to 1950.

Though Peter Vogel, who theorized that a nuclear weapon existed at Port Chicago, was granted permission to review the film and obtain still shots – once his theory of an atomic weapon was known by the Navy, the film was destroyed. About the same time, a key document, Technical Report No. 6 on the Port Chicago Explosion was suddenly reclassified to top secret after years of being declassified. Some Los Alamos scientists have privately stated that the explosion at Port Chicago was caused by an atomic weapon.

TOP NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS INVESTIGATE PORT CHICAGO

Perhaps the most convincing aspect of the atomic bomb theory, is not what happened before the blast – but after. The test document, History of 10,000 Ton Gadget, was prepared by a group at the Los Alamos laboratories under the direction of Joseph O. Hirschfelder. His group’s work is found in the Manhattan District History, Project Y. The Los Alamos Project. Vol. 1. 1944 I.A.M.S. 2532, Los Alamos 1961. The Manhattan Project has become known to the public as the building of the first atomic bomb. The Manhattan Project documents refer to work accomplished after August 1, 1944, and in particular the History of 10,000 Ton Gadget. Hirschfelder was given the responsibility for completing the earlier investigation of damage of the general phenomenology of a nuclear explosion. These investigations included the formation of the shock wave in the air, the radiation history of the early stages of the explosion, the formation of the ball of fire, the attenuation of the blast wave in air at great distances, and the effects of blast and radiation on human beings and structures.

Immediately following the Port Chicago explosion, a team of Los Alamos Laboratories scientists made an assessment of the Port Chicago explosion. There exists some 400 – 600 pages of reports and memoranda at Los Alamos which report the various parameters and artifacts of the Port Chicago explosion. U.S. Naval Captain William J. Parsons prepared the data and had them transmitted to Rear Admiral W. R. Purnell, who was a member of the Atomic Bomb Military Policy Committee, Admiral Purnell was Parsons’ superior officer. Parsons was the bombing officer on board the Enola Gay, which dropped the U235 weapon over Hiroshima. In 1946 he was chairman of the Joint Crossroads Committee, which planned the Bikini test, and he was Deputy Task Force Commander for Technical Direction of the Bikini nuclear tests. Parsons was instrumental in designing, constructing and testing the world’s first atomic bomb. He worked directly under J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Parsons authored a report on Port Chicago – Effects of the Tidal Wave in the Port Chicago Explosion. Throughout the investigation of the Port Chicago blast, the nuclear research laboratories at Los Alamos, the key figures in the building of the atomic bomb, all link to Port Chicago. Los Alamos also maintains copies of the records of 16 box cars that contained munitions for Port Chicago. The records of two of those box cars, however, are not available. Were they used to carry nuclear components?

It is reasonably safe to indicate, with reference to various articles already published in this series, that an atomic weapon did exist at Port Chicago at the time of the July 17, 1944 explosion. The next question, testing Vogel’s theory, is: was Port Chicago used by the U.S. government to test the first atomic bomb?

A TEST OR AN ACCIDENT?

Vogel maintains that Port Chicago was used as a test site for the first atomic bomb. “If the explosion was filmed at the Port Chicago site, it would follow that the explosion was planned and anticipated.” Vogel states. “There is very little doubt in my mind that the explosion and disaster which occurred at Port Chicago was the result of an intentional detonation of a U235 gun assembly weapon, which was conducted to demonstrate the effects of a surface delivery of that device to a harbor facility.” But was it?

To explore Vogel’s theory, it is necessary to take some of the elements used by Vogel. A large part of his theory rests on the insistence that there was only one explosion. In almost every report, newspaper articles of that time, or eyewitness statements, two explosions were reported. Those reports, articles and statements may be correct – while at the same time, Vogel’s theory may also be correct. A nuclear explosion has two phases – the pressure phase and the suction phase. These two phases may actually sound like and appear to be two different explosions, when in fact it is the same explosion occurring seconds apart. Most witnesses have stated the explosions were about 45 seconds apart. They report that the dock blew up first and then the ship. Vogel’s theory of one explosion cannot be discounted – nor can the two explosion theory.

If there were two explosions, there is a strong possibility of an accident in the loading of conventional ammunition aboard the E.A. Bryan, which in turn ignited the low-yield nuclear device which weighed approximately 9000 pounds.

RE-CREATING EVENTS

A re-creation of the events of July 17, 1944, are necessary to test Vogel’s theory. The scenario presented is one that coincides with official classified Navy documents of the investigation, eye witness reports, newspaper reports, and other publications.

The ammunition depot at Port Chicago was only 80 percent completed, but was one of the main sources of supply for the Pacific fleet. The dock facilities could handle the largest ammunition carriers in the Navy. It was under the jurisdiction of the Naval Commander at Mare Island.

The E.A. Bryan docked at Port Chicago on July 13 and the loading of munitions began at 8:30 a.m. that morning and continued until the explosion 109 hours and 49 minutes later. Here is a list of the contents being loaded:

• 50.04 tons of 20-mm HEI Tetryl Cartridges.
• 50.09 tons of 5-inch 38-calibre Common Projectiles.
• 36 tons of 16-inch Tar. Mk2-4A Projectiles.
• 87.55 tons of 1000 lb. GP AN-M65 TNT Bombs.
• 106 tons of 1000 lb. AP AN-M33 Bombs.
• 26 tons of Fin assemblies for AN M-65 Bombs.
• 60.35 tons of incendiary Cluster M7.
• 97 tons of 350 lb. DB AN-Mk 47 Torpex Bombs.
• 93.52 tons of 100 lb. Fragmentation Cluster An-M4.
• 42 tons of 40-mm AP Tracer Cartridges.

The placement of the ammunition in the E.A. Bryan were as follows:

• No. 1 hold – smoke bombs.
• No. 2 hold – Torpex.
• No. 3 hold – Tail fins for air bombs.
• No. 4 hold – Fragmentation bombs.
• No. 5 hold – 40-mm ammunition.

The Bryan’s holds were as deep as a four-story building. The ship had only completed its maiden voyage earlier that year and had been refitted with 10-ton booms before arriving at Port Chicago.

Navy records indicate different problems plagued the loading of the E.A. Bryan. There had been trouble with the steam winches – which had no brakes, and meant that any cargo being hoisted could slam to the ground if steam power was lost at any time. There were also bearing and valve problems with the winches. More problems occurred when the crank bearing on the No. 2 winch began making a hammering noise – its bearing had to be replaced. On the day of the explosion a bleeder valve on the No. 4 winch had gone out and had to be repaired. A plumber repairing a nipple on the bleeder valve said upon completion of his repairs, “I don’t like the look of things around here.” The man had just observed one of the deck hands lose his grip on a shell – it dropped two feet and hit the deck with a thud.

The incendiary bombs had their activating mechanisms, or fuses, installed. They were considered “hot cargo” and were being loaded gingerly, one bomb at a time. “The men were having some difficulty getting the bombs out of the boxcar because they were wedged on so tightly,” one officer testified.

AT THE HEARING

A Naval inquiry after the explosion called upon 125 witnesses to testify. At the hearing there was a major dispute centered on whether unsafe loading practices where employed at Port Chicago, and why no Coast Guard loading detail was present the night of the explosion. The Coast Guard and the Port Director’s Office had inexperienced personnel who were unable to properly supervise the loading operation and created problems for the work.

Records also show that as early as October 1943, the Coast Guard warned the Port Director, “Conditions are bad up there (at Port Chicago), you’ve got to do something about itÉif you aren’t careful, something’s going to happen, and you’ll be held responsible for it.” An effort to bring in contract stevedores and experienced officers failed. The captain of the port decided to withdraw the Coast Guard detail because conditions were so bad that he was unwilling to take responsibility for it. Contract stevedores were used at other Bay Area Navy facilities, but not at Port Chicago or Mare Island. The Coast Guard loading detail was absent on the night of the explosion.

The inquiry was also very concerned over encouraged competition between loading crews. “The loading of explosives should never be a matter if competition,” the inquiry stated. The witnesses also stated that “the colored enlisted personnel are neither temperamentally or intellectually capable of handling high explosives. These men could not understand the orders which were given to them and the only way they could be made to understand what they should do was by actual demonstration.” The court did find that there was rough and careless handling of the explosives being loaded aboard ships at Port Chicago.

“Inherent defects in the bombs might have been a contributory cause, but there must have been some overt act to cause the bomb to actually explode,” the court stated. Though it never found an exact cause for the explosion, the court did consider the “Presence of a supersensitive element which was detonated in the course of rough handling.”

Another classified document reveals concern for the loading of ammunition at Port Chicago. Confidential memoranda ND12-16-Bd (SC) S78 Serial 40312, from the Commandant Twelfth Naval District to the Officer-in-Charge, Naval Ammunition Deport, Port Chicago, was written on September 23, 1944 – two months after the explosion. The memoranda called attention to the Torpex bombs – there were 97 tons of these bombs being loaded. “Torpex generates a hydrogen gas which causes expansion within the projectile, rending it necessary on occasion to release this gas in order to reduce the projectile’s sensitivity to accidental detonation.”

The 6-day-old Quinault Victory arrived at Port Chicago at approximately 7 p.m. on July 17 – less than three hours before the explosion. It was not being loaded, but was opposite the pier from the E.A. Bryan. It was the Quinault Victory that the visitors of the “shiny, black car” were visiting.

The box cars were on the pier. The first explosion is reported to have taken the pier out first – the second explosion on the ships.

TESTING VOGEL’S THEORY

Now, on the assumption that Vogel’s theory is correct, that the government purposely blew up Port Chicago, there are certain characteristics that are important:

• The ship would not be mixed with loaded munitions because the total test result would be inaccurate.
• Would the government destroy its most productive West coast ammunition port which was only 80 percent completed?
• Would two brand new ships be used in a test, rather than older vessels?
• Would an untested bomb be used in a populated area and jeopardize thousands of lives and critical infrastructure?
• Would there be two explosions? And why would the pier area blow up before the ship?

There are too many improbabilities associated with Vogels’ theory of a test – when other facilities in the South Pacific or more isolated, less important facilities could have been use as a test site.

POSSIBLE SCENARIO

Based upon the records and documents that have been made public and at least reviewed, the following scenario might be drawn:

• The first atomic bomb was indeed loaded. Not on the E.A. Bryan, but on the Quinault Victory.
• That bomb, like the two later dropped on Japan, was destined for the South Pacific. The bomb would be held on Tinian and a B29 – which already existed – would carry that bomb over Japan.
• The “shiny, black car” contained scientists from Los Alamos, checking on the security of the system.
• The Navy was filming Port Chicago – not to capture an explosion, but to provide a complete documentary of the ship’s progress, the filming process would continue through delivery to Tinian and beyond.
• Because it was an atomic bomb that exploded, the U.S. government had to classify everything so as to avoid the enemy learning of the device. Future reclassification could protect the U.S. from a major international embarrassment during a nuclear-freeze frenzy in this country.
• There was some type of accident in the loading process, which caused a major explosion – but not he main one. That explosion ruptured and activated the nuclear device.

Obviously, these theories are speculative at best, but they are based upon the documentation that even some of the Naval inquiry people did not have in 1944. Regardless of Vogel’s conspiracy theory – the fact is that Vogel has provided sufficient evidence to prove a very high probability that a low-yield atomic explosion destroyed Port Chicago – and that American sailors were the first nuclear casualties in warfare, not the Japanese.

SOURCES

• The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1962.
• Computational Evaluation for the Energy Released in the Port Chicago Explosion, 1988.
• Confidential Memoranda B-3-16437 from District Intelligence Officer, Twelfth Naval District on Explosion Naval Magazine, Port Chicago, July 21, 1944. Declassified 1989.
• Confidential Memoranda ND12-16-Bd (SC) S78 Serial 40312 from Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, Evaluation of Hydrogen from Torpex, September 23, 1944. Declassified 1989.
• Intra-Office memoranda ND12-02-MI-WWJ from District Legal Offices, Board of Investigation of damages sustained by Port Chicago, August 14, 1945. Declassified 1989.
• Letter to Don Cox, Enrichment Office Division, U.S. Department of Energy, Oakridge, Tennessee, Production of U235 during the years 1913-1919. December 9, 1980.
• Manhattan District History, Project Y. The Los Alamos Project, Vol. 1, LAMS-2532. Los Alamos 1961.
• History of a 10,000 ton gadget, Los Alamos Laboratories Autumn 1944.
• KVON Doubletalk with Peter Vogel, December 26, 1989.
• The Port Chicago Mutiny, Robert L. Allen, 1989.
• No Share of Glory, Robert E. Pearson, 1964.
• California History, Black vs. Navy Blue: The Mare Island Mutiny Court Martial, Charles Wollenberg, Spring 1979.
• The Black Scholar, Port Chicago Disaster And Its Aftermath, Robert Allen, 1982
• The Black Scholar, The Last Wave From Port Chicago, Peter Vogel, July 1982.
• Interview. Peter Vogel, January 1990.
• San Jose Mercury News, Port Chicago remains enigma 45 years later, July 16, 1989.
• San Francisco Chronicle, Blast Death Toll Now 377: 1000 Injured! July 19, 1944.
• St. Helena Star, Terrific Explosion at Port Chicago Startles St. Helena Residents, July 211, 19454.
• Napa Journal, Phone Crews Act Quickly to Mend Explosion Damage, July 28, 1944.
• Napa Journal, Napa Red Cross, Doctors and Nurses Assistant at Port Chicago. July 21, 1944.

Additional Evidence Surfaces In Port Chicago Blast 

By Harry V. Martin

Sometimes obscure personal documents from the past can help to substantiate theories of today. Recently the Napa Sentinel ran a series of articles on the Port Chicago explosion. The articles indicated that the theory of Peter Vogel, as voiced on KVON’s Doubletalk, had plausibility in one area, and lacked supporting documentation in the other.

The article stated Vogel’s theory was that an atomic bomb exploded at Port Chicago was highly plausible according to documents obtained by Vogel and the Sentinel. The article disputed Vogel’s claim that the atomic explosion was really a test conducted by the U.S. Navy. The Sentinel maintained that the explosion was an accident – and perhaps a nuclear accident, at that.

New information has surfaced to give additional credibility to the nuclear accident theory. Carl Wehr, who died some time ago, was a Navy commander at Port Chicago and other ammunition loading facilities on the West Coast. His widow still lives in St. Helena. Wehr wrote a history of his Naval career entitled Up Through The Hawse Pipe, a compendium of events of life in the working navy through the enlisted ranks to commission status. Wehr’s records were not written for public review, but his comments on pages 33 through 36 give credence to the Sentinel articles. The Sentinel did not exist during Wehr’s lifetime.

“By 1944, we were shipping 180,000 tons (ammunition) a month to the Pacific theater. We loaded ammunition out of every major port on the West Coast, the largest tonnage by far, going through facilities in the Bay Area – principally the ammunition depot at Port Chicago which was built primarily as a shipping terminal for ammunition,” his personal notes state. Wehr indicates that some 250 box car loads of ammunition were in revetment on the base waiting to load, “The explosion aboard the Quinault Victory took took 322 lives, most of them instantly. The dead were the ship’s crew, stevedores, and trainmen,” The amazing fact, according to Wehr, who was a high official at Port Chicago, was that of the 250 car loads of ammunition waiting to be loaded and in the revetments, “none of the ammunition was damaged.” 

Wehr pointed out what he felt might have been the cause of the explosion, though he admits he had not seen any official reports. “We do know that Torpex bombs were being loaded that night and it’s quite possible that one of these could have been roughly handled or even dropped down into the hold of the ship,” he wrote. “Torpex was a new explosive introduced into the Navy early in the war, it was extremely powerful, much more than the standard TNT, and more sensitive. Wehr cited two incidents related to torpex. “There were two accidents reported involving torpex bombs. In one case, a bomb fell from a bomb trailer being towed along a runway at an airfield near Norfork, Virginia and exploded. In another instance a torpex bomb exploded at the ammunition depot on Oahu in the Hawiian Islands. This occurred when the bomb was jolted in handling.” Wehr also stated. “The explosive had a propensity on rare occasions to detonate with rough handling. And rough handling of ammunition in the loading operation was not uncommon.” Wehr added, “One day at Port Chicago, I was standing near a hatch watching gun powder for fourteen inch guns being loaded. A damaged container holding nearly a hundred pounds of smokeless powder was set aside on the hatch cover, one of the loading crew was told to remove it, which he did – by rolling it along with his foot. The container got away from him and dropped through the open hatch and down two decks.” 

The Sentinel had projected that torpex bombs may have accidentally exploded – and if a nuclear device was at the Port, set it off as well.

Vogel theorized that the explosion was actually a test of an atomic weapon and the Port was expendable. The Sentinel theory indicated that whatever type of explosion it was, it was accidental. “The loss of the Port Chicago facility was aggravated by the severe restriction placed on the movement and handling of explosives at facilities other than those specifically designated for that use,” Wehr wrote. “After the explosion, we couldn’t transport a thirty caliber bullet over the Bay Bridges. Moreover, loading demands increased as tonnage escalated. For the invasion of Okinawa I needed berthing for twelve shiploads of Marine Corps ammunition. I flew to Seattle and, in conference with the Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District and the Coast Guard, arranged for loading several ships at Tacoma.” Wehr was admitting that the destruction of Port Chicago was a crippling blow to the war effort as a major push was being made to capture Okinawa and the Marianas.

The Sentinel articles also indicated that the atomic bomb that dropped on Hiroshima was shipped aboard the cruiser U.S.S. Indianapolis. In Wehr’s notes he states, “One night about midnight, I received a telephone call at home from a lieutenant at the Oakland Naval Supply Depot, saying the Southern Pacific had two express cars which had arrived at the rail yard with a shipment of classified material identified only as “Bowery.” The cars were under Marine guard and what to do with them? I told him I knew nothing about it but would get on it first thing the next morning. At eight o’clock the next morning I went into the office of my commanding officer, Commander Weatherwax, and told him of the arrival of project “Bowery.” He leaped to his feet and shouted, “Where the hell did you learn about Bowery? The Admiral, the Chief of Staff and myself know of this!” After he calmed down, he told me this was a highly classified project and he would take care of it himself. Later I learned that “Bowery” was the first atomic bomb shipment. It was loaded aboard the cruiser Indianapolis and shipped to Guam.” He even verified the statement in the Sentinel that the Indianapolis was sunk after delivering the bomb.

After the Port Chicago blast, the manifest of the destroyed box cars were revealed after a public records request. The government supplied all the details of every boxcar – except two. The government indicated that the manifests of those two boxcars probably contained the nuclear components and that the manifests were classified top secret. In Wehr’s report of the atomic bomb shipment to Port Chicago in 1945 – less than a year after the explosion – he stated the contents were contained in two box cars. Accidents do happen. In 1957 – 13 years after Port Chicago – an Air Force plane hit turbulence over New Mexico and it accidentally dropped a hydrogen bomb, which was 625 times greater than the atomic bomb that was used on Hiroshima, The U.S. government covered up this accident until 1985, when an Albuquerque journalist began investigating New Mexico’s nuclear weapons research facilities with a simple question: Have they ever had any nuclear accidents? He finally filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the Pentagon – 10 months later the file was released. The 42,000 pound MK-17 bomb was the nation’s first “droppable” hydrogen bomb. It was the largest bomb ever produced by the United States.

Fortunately, in this case, the explosives gouged a 25-foot crater in the earth, but the nuclear device was not detonated. Like the Port Chicago case, the U.S. government emphatically denied the accident, but when it released the public records, it showed the government had lied. The journalist challenged the governments first refusal to submit the material. He wrote, “It strains the credibility of the Air Force to contend that release of information about accidents involving 35-and 28-year-old weapons – which are now obsolete – will in any way endanger national security. “After 10 months, the investigative reporter received stacks of document from the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center concerning the nuclear accident.

The old diary and the Freedom of Information Act provides critical data that is not easily obtained from government officials – who will often deny events at first. When the media accepts the government’s line, without verification, it only serves to aid deception and misinformation,. The Sentinel has filed a Freedom of Information Act request to obtain full documentation on the Port Chicago blast, including Technical Report No. 6 which was reclassified after inquiries about the explosion began to proliferate.

Source: A MUSHROOM CLOUD: What really happened at Port Chicago in 1944, a nuclear explosion? By Harry V. Martin C. FreeAmerica and Harry V. Martin, 1995