According to the official narrative in Wikipedia:
On the afternoon of 23 October, approximately 20,000 protesters convened next to the statue of József Bem – a national hero of Poland and Hungary. Péter Veres, president of the Writers’ Union (hu: Írószövetség), read a manifesto to the crowd. Its claims were Hungary’s independence from all foreign powers; a political system based on democratic socialism (land reform and public ownership in the economy); Hungary joining the United Nations; and all freedom rights for the citizens of Hungary. After reading out the proclamation, the crowd began to chant a censored patriotic poem, the National Song (Hu: Nemzeti dal), with the refrain: “This we swear, this we swear, that we will no longer be slaves.” Someone in the crowd cut out the Communist coat of arms from the Hungarian flag, leaving a distinctive hole in the middle of it, and others quickly followed suit.
Afterwards, most of the crowd crossed the River Danube to join demonstrators outside the Parliament Building. By 18:00, the multitude had swollen to more than 200,000 people; the demonstration was spirited, but peaceful.
At 20:00, the first secretary of the ruling party, Ernő Gerő broadcast a speech condemning the writers’ and students’ demands. Angered by Gerő’s hard-line rejection, some demonstrators decided to carry out one of their demands, the removal of Stalin’s 30-foot-high (9.1 m) bronze statue that was erected in 1951 on the site of a former church, which was demolished to make room for the monument.[50] By 21:30, the statue was toppled and the crowd celebrated by placing Hungarian flags into Stalin’s boots, which was all that was left of the statue.[49]
At about the same time, a large crowd gathered at the headquarters of the Hungarian Radio, which was heavily guarded by the ÁVH. The flash point was reached as a delegation attempting to broadcast their demands was detained. The crowd outside the building grew increasingly unruly as rumours spread that the members of the delegation had been killed. Tear gas was thrown from the upper windows and the ÁVH opened fire on the crowd, killing many. The ÁVH tried to re-supply itself by hiding arms inside an ambulance car, but the crowd detected the ruse and intercepted it. Soldiers were sent to the spot relieving the security forces but they tore off the red stars from their caps and sided with the crowd. Provoked by the ÁVH attack, protesters reacted violently. Police cars were set ablaze, guns were seized from military depots and distributed to the mass while symbols of the regime were vandalised.
During the night of 23 October, Hungarian Working People’s Party Secretary Ernő Gerő requested Soviet military intervention “to suppress a demonstration that was reaching an ever greater and unprecedented scale”. The Soviet leadership had formulated contingency plans for intervention in Hungary several months before. By 02:00 on 24 October, acting in accordance with orders of Georgy Zhukov, the Soviet defence minister, Soviet tanks entered Budapest.
By noon, on 24 October, Soviet tanks were stationed outside the Parliament, and Soviet soldiers guarded key bridges and crossroads. Armed revolutionaries quickly set up barricades to defend Budapest, and were reported to have already captured some Soviet tanks by mid-morning. That day, Imre Nagy replaced András Hegedüs as Prime Minister. On the radio, Nagy called for an end to violence and promised to initiate political reforms that had been shelved three years earlier. The population continued to arm itself as sporadic violence erupted.
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In this video from a book tour in the 1990s, British historian David Irving explains how he had come to the conclusion that the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 had actually started out as an anti-Jewish pogrom, and how this factual conclusion had so offended a group of Jews at one of his lectures that they tried to shut him down.
Irving’s response to the disruptive Jews goes right to the heart of “The Jewish Question,” a question that they collectively refuse to ever ask, and even more certainly will always refuse to answer:
A book I wrote in about 1975 was….the history of the Hungarian Uprising against the communist occupation of Hungary, for which I had access to a certain number of C.I.A. files, which are very interesting because the C.I.A. carried out in-depth psychological interrogations of a large the Hungarian refugees who came to this country after 1956.
And there was no doubt in my mind, a very interesting discovery indeed, which I wasn’t aware of until I began investigating that. I didn’t realize this. The reason I began writing a book about the Hungarian Uprising was entirely irrelevant. I decided to write a book about something other than Hitler and the Third Reich just to show that I wasn’t in a rut.
But the odd thing was when I began writing that book, I discovered from the C.I.A. files that the Hungarian people, when they started that uprising, it began as an anti-Jewish pogrom. It was essentially an anti-Jewish revolution, not an anti-communist revolution to begin with for the first few days.
The Hungarian people regarded their government in the 1950s as being a jewish government, and they regarded the secret police, the dreaded [AVH] as being a jewish secret police, and essentially it was because when the Red Army entered Hungary in 1945, they brought back into Hungary all the Jews who had taken refuge in the Soviet Union, and they were the ones who got the plum jobs, and they were the ones who got the trustworthy jobs, the secret police chiefs and the torturers.
And that’s why the Jews were so hated in Hungary by 1956 because they were regarded as the people who had inflicted this nameless misery on the Hungarian people, and so the Uprising began as an anti-Jewish uprising.
Every one of the ‘Hungarian’ leaders at that time in 1956….they were all Jews, and I never realized that when I set out to write it. It was an extraordinary fact the way these things are kept away from the public consciousness.
And, of course, when the book came out, I was accused of ‘antisemitism’, but what am I supposed to do when you discover something, as a historian, are you supposed to pretend that it isn’t that? And if you do pretend that, you are doing the Jewish people more harm than good, I think.
[Irving then tells how a group of Jews tried to disrupt one of his lectures in Louisiana…]I know — I said to this Jewish mob in my audience — that I am disliked, and I know why I’m disliked. Now you people have been disliked for 3,000 years. Do you ever look in the mirror and ask yourselves why you are disliked?….They never ask themselves that question, do they?
He was the leader of the [disruptive Jewish gang in the audience], and he said, “Are you accusing us? Are you saying that we are responsible for Auschwitz ourselves?” And it was a bit of a dazzling question, and I said, “Well, the short answer is yes.”
But that’s a cruel answer because to do the question justice, you’ve got to have a lot of intervening stages, of course. But the short answer, if you want to hop from A to Z, is yes. If you hadn’t behaved the way you have as a race for 3,000 years, first the Russians, then the Poles, then the Galicians, then the Austrians and the rest wouldn’t have harried and hounded you from pillar to post so you end up finding yourselves at Auschwitz. And you’ve never asked yourselves, “Why?”
https://christiansfortruth.com/historian-david-irving-explains-why-jews-themselves-are-responsible-for-ending-up-in-auschwitz/
An excerpt from David Irving’s Uprising: One Nation’s Nightmare (published by Hodder & Stoughton in 1981):
[…] WHEN Irving embarked on his research, political interest in 1956 had already started to wane in the West. By 1966, one had the feeling that the Western media were willing to turn a blind eye on 1956 as a result of Kádár’s successful efforts at consolidating his rule. However, by the time Irving’s book was published in 1981, this momentary lapse of interest had passed. It was not just the anniversary that placed Irving’s book in an entirely different context. Dramatic changes were fermenting inside the Soviet Empire and superpower relations, changes which all worked towards enhancing the significance of 1956. From a major tragic episode in the Cold War years, it was beginning to take on the status of the Soviet Empire’s Stalingrad.It is worth examining Irving’s book in this context. I shall not bother pointing out the factual errors. From the historian’s viewpoint there is much more to learn by studying what kind of picture Irving presents of 1956 in 1981 to a western audience that unanimously regarded the 1956 Revolution as a democratic popular movement.
The title Uprising! already indicates that, in defiance of the popular view, the author does not see 1956 as a revolution. In his Introduction he quotes Trotsky: “Historians and politicians usually give the name of spontaneous insurrection to a movement of the masses united by a common hostility against the old regime, but not having a clear aim, deliberated methods of struggle, or leadership, consciously showing the way to victory”; then he continues his argument by claiming the following: “What happened in Hungary in October 1956 was not a revolution but an insurrection. It was an uprising. When it began it was spontaneous and leaderless, and it was truly a movement of the masses bound by one common hatred of the old regime.”
In his introduction Irving dissociated himself from the view that assigned to Imre Nagy and the group of intellectuals rallying around him — whom he repeatedly calls “eggheads” — a glorious role either in the uprising, or in the preparations leading to it. “Nor am I tempted to shed tears over the fate of Imre Nagy, who found himself cast willy-nilly in the role of rebel premier. I (…) find little that distinguishes him from the other faceless Communists who were carried into power from Moscow exile, and sustained there by the guns of Soviet tanks.”
Irving takes an avid interest in the Jewish element among those who played a role in Hungarian history after the war and during 1956. The book’s English edition begins with a biographical rundown of the main protagonists. Each entry, where it is at all possible, begins with the statement “Jewish” (Irving actually makes occasional mistakes), a statement which precedes information relating to occupation or position. In the rest of these potted biographies Irving fails to mention whether or not the person is “Magyar”. He reveals nothing of the origins of Cardinal Mindszenty (originally Péhm), György Marosán or János Csermanek (Kádár’s original surname), surnames that all suggest non-Magyar origins). Interestingly, this biographical list was not included in the German edition of the book. Irving explained to a reviewer of the German edition, Wilhelm Dietl, “this could have caused misunderstandings in Germany.” Jewish origin is indicated even for individuals who had absolutely nothing to do with the events in Hungary, as with one French journalist: “Michel Gordey, Jewish reporter on France-Soir“.
Irving makes no bones about his opinion that the Jewish question and anti-Semitism played a crucial role in the Hungarian events. The latent anti-Semitism of the ordinary population was aroused by the all-out terror unleashed by the Jewish clique both among the Muscovite Communists and in the ÁVH (State Security Bureau), still trying to avenge the mass-murder of Jews in 1944. While still in Moscow, through his dealings in the Comintern, Mátyás Rákosi seized leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party with “the tact of a kosher butcher”); upon his return to Hungary he used similar brutality in slicing up the non-Communist political parties. After all this it was small wonder if the “regime’s high Jewish profile caused deep popular resentment…” On the basis of the interviews conducted with Hungarian refugees of 1956 as part of Columbia University’s Oral History Project, he [Irving] states: “Paradoxically, the anti-Semitism generated by the Communist activities was so pervasive that many Jews were themselves infected by it.” The second, 1986, edition of his book also had a subtitle, “One Nation’s Nightmare”.
This explains why Irving’s account wasted no words on the political turn that the year 1953 (Imre Nagy’s first premiership) had brought, just as it also ignored the Party’s internal opposition gathering around Imre Nagy, the Petöfi Circle, the workers’ councils, the local revolutionary committees, and the re-established political parties, all of which were considered important political factors in historical works devoted to 1956. In Irving’s view, Imre Nagy drifted helplessly with the events. Initially he tried to preserve the Party’s power. Irving takes Marosán’s claim at face value, whereby Imre Nagy had consented to inviting the Soviet troops on the night of October 23. Later, Nagy was forced to accept the insurgents’ demands under the pressure of the the street. “Bit by bit he was dragging himself like a mortally injured cowboy along the dusty track down which the rebel hordes had long galloped with their demands. He could never catch up.”
Irving regards the insurgent street-fighters as the true protagonists of 1956. In that light it is all the more peculiar that, with a few exceptions, he habitually refers to them as “rebel/revolutionary mob” or “hordes”. He has little sympathy for the secret police, the ÁVH, yet he hints that “As Münnich and his evil cronies must have foreseen, in the country’s present mood the result of disbanding of the ÁVH was bound to be a pogrom.” As, indeed, the events proved.
“The mob rage was primeval, primitive and brutal. It was the closest that the uprising came to an anti-Semitic pogrom, as the largely Jewish ÁVH officials were mercilessly winkled out of the boltholes where they fled,” Irving writes on the lynchings.
Similarly to the “counter-revolutionary” accounts loyal to Kádár, Irving, too, presents the bloodbath in Köztársaság Square (above) as the crucial turning point, the moment when Imre Nagy and his government completely lost control of events. It was typical of the ensuing chaos, according to Irving, that on November 1 the Communist apparatchiks rallying around Nagy were already talking of a possible repetition of the White Terror that had followed the put-down of the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919.
As the story goes, it was precisely these developments, the death of Party Secretary Imre Mezö and the threat of a civil war, which motivated Kádár to switch to the Russian side. The picture is a dramatic one: Kádár swears revenge at Imre Mezö’s deathbed. Both he and Khrushchev had to hurry if they wanted to salvage something from the situation. “A historic decision confronts Khrushchev. He cannot risk a NATO presence in Hungary, nor can he delay his action too long: at any moment a final pogrom may liquidate the country’s remaining funkies.”
