Finally, one may wonder at how the millions of citizens in the States that seceded were denied their opportunity to peacefully determine their own destiny. The duly elected governments of the States had now become subservient to the will of the Federal Government, effectively nullifying much of the original intent of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. Lincoln had indicted the population of the South for treason for doing nothing more than what the patriots of 1776 had done. (FWS p. 136).
President Buchanan had declared that he could find no constitutional authority for using force against any State that seceded. However, contrary to the views he held as a Congressman in 1848, President Lincoln declared, in effect, “I have taken an oath to uphold the Constitution, which means, in my opinion, a union of the states. I shall do anything in my power to sustain the Constitution and the union, regardless of the constitutional aspect of what I do” (WEW p. 525).
Rumor and speculation as to Lincoln’s intentions toward the South led the March 6, 1861, edition of the New York Herald to write,
“We have no doubt Mr. Lincoln wants the Cabinet at Montgomery to take the initiative by capturing the two forts in its waters, for it would give him the opportunity of throwing upon the Southern Confederacy the responsibility of commencing hostilities. But the country and posterity will hold him just as responsible as if he struck the first blow […]” (GLD p. 95).
On March 8, 1861, George W. Brent, a delegate to the Virginia State Convention to debate the direction of the State, spoke words that were representative of that body.
“Recognizing as I have always done, the right of a state to secede, to judge of the violation of its rights and to appeal to its own mode for redress, could not uphold the Federal Government in any attempt to coerce the seceding states to bring them back into the Union” (BBM p. 265-67).
Lincoln sought to influence the Virginia Convention to adjourn without making a decision of secession, and without his assurance that he would not attempt to coerce the seceded States back into the Union (BBM p. 270).
In the Constitution of the Confederate States of America, its framers sought to eliminate ambiguities that gave rise to the grievances that led to the secession of the Southern States, at the core of which was the centralization of government to the detriment of the States. The issue of States’ rights as a major cause of the secession of the Southern States becomes clear in the issue of the Confederate States Supreme Court. Although Article III of the C.S. Constitution, adopted on March 11, 1861, establishes the Supreme Court, federal encroachment upon States’ rights fostered by rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court were still fresh in the minds of the C.S. Congress. Author Marshall L. DeRosa relates,
“In response to a bill introduced in the C.S.A. Senate to organize the Supreme Court, William Yancey of Alabama remarked in no uncertain terms that ‘when we decide that the state courts are of inferior dignity to this Court, we have sapped the main pillars of this Confederacy.’”
As a result of this mindset, the actual establishment of the C.S. Supreme Court never took place (MLD p.75-77).
Consistent with the South’s persistent objection to protectionist trade tariffs, the C.S. Constitution explicitly forbade them (WEW p. 513; MLD p. 94; SF p. 42).
“The Congress shall have power–
1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, for revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for the common defense, and carry on the Government of the Confederate States; but no bounties shall be granted from the Treasury; nor shall any duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry; and all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the Confederate States:” (emphasis added)(Article 1, Section 8, clause 1, Confederate States Constitution; MLD p. 139)
As slavery was legal under the United States Constitution, so it was in the Confederate States. Under the C.S. Constitution, slavery was explicitly recognized as an institution of the States, whereas in the U.S. Constitution the issue of slavery in general was intentionally vague. As in the United States, the federal government of the Confederate States was prohibited from interfering with slavery within the States. The States of the Confederacy, however, were not constitutionally required to recognize or continue the practice of slavery within their own borders. In fact, several proposals to require that each State continue to recognize slavery were not adopted during the Constitutional Convention. The consensus, as voiced by Senator Albert G. Brown of Mississippi, was that “each State is sovereign within its own limits; and that each for itself can abolish or establish slavery for itself” (MLD p. 68-71).
The C.S. Constitution did not explicitly provide for the right of secession because it was assumed to be an act of sovereignty that the States had not delegated or otherwise abdicated. After all, they had just exercised this ultimate remedy themselves. In the preamble to the C.S. Constitution, using the words “each State acting in its own sovereign and independent character,” the framers implicitly allowed for secession by emphasizing the understanding of each State’s sovereign nature (MLD p. 53; SF p. 42).
On March 12, 1861, three Confederate commissioners, who had come to Washington seeking negotiations toward a peaceable separation and offer payment for apportioned public debt and seized federal property, addressed Secretary of State William Seward with an official letter of intent. Having open the lower Mississippi River to the free flow of commerce, the Confederate government expected reciprocal gestures from Lincoln, including the evacuation of Fort Sumter (SF p. 45). Seward, speaking only through Supreme Court Justice John A. Campbell, assured the Confederate commissioners that the Union troops in Fort Sumter in Charleston and Fort Pickens in Pensacola would be evacuated in three days (WEW p. 522; SF p. 45-46).
In reply to Lincoln’s March 15, 1861, inquiry as to the advisability of provisioning Fort Sumter, Secretary of State William Seward wrote,
“If it were possible to peaceably provision Fort Sumter, of course, I should answer that it would be unwise and inhuman not to attempt it. But the facts of the case are known to be that the attempt must be made with the employment of military and marine force which would provoke combat and probably initiate a civil war which the Government of the United States would be committed to maintain, through all changes, to some definite conclusion.” (CA p. 45; BBM p. 285)
On March 18, 1861, the Philadelphia Press demanded in part:
“Blockade Southern Ports. With no protective tariff, European goods will under-price Northern goods in Southern markets. Cotton for Northern mills will be charged an export tax. This will cripple the clothing industries and make British mills prosper. Finally, the great inland waterways, the Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Ohio Rivers will be subject to Southern tolls” (CA p. 65).
On March 22-23, 1861, the economics editor of the New York Times reversed his position and now advocated, “At once shut down every Southern port, destroy its commerce and bring utter ruin on the Confederate States” (CA p. 65).
Concern over the alarming reduction in Government and commercial revenue due to the loss Southern ports of entry highlight a powerful motivating force in regaining the South. The New York Times made the following points on March 30, 1861:
The predicament in which both the Government and the commerce of the country are placed, through the non-enforcement of our revenue laws, is now thoroughly understood […] If the manufacturer at Manchester [England] can send his goods into the Western States through New Orleans at less cost than through New York, he is a fool for not availing himself of his advantage […] If the importations of the country are made through Southern ports, its exports will go through the same channel. The produce of the West, instead of coming to our own ports by the millions of tons, to be transported abroad by the same ships through which we received our importations, will seek other routes and other outlets. With the loss of our foreign trade, what is to become of our public works, conducted at the cost of many hundred millions of dollars, to turn into our harbor the products of the interior? They share in the common ruin. So do our manufacturers […] Once at New Orleans, goods may be distributed over the whole country duty free […] We were divided and confused till our pockets were touched (JRK p. 51-52).
On April 1, 1861, Justice Campbell returned to find out from Seward why Sumter had not been evacuated as he had told the Southern envoys it would be. Seward now told the shocked Campbell, “I am satisfied the government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens [of South Carolina].” As Campbell relayed this latest development, the Southern envoys saw that the this likely spelled trouble. In their report back to the Confederate government in Montgomery they said, “The war wing presses on the President; he vibrates to that side… Their form of notice to us may be that of a coward, who gives it when he strikes” (SF 46-47).
The April 5, 1861, New York Tribune reported,
“Many rumors are in circulation to-day. They appear to have originated from movements on the part of the United States troops, the reasons for which have not been communicated to the reporters at Washington as freely as the late Administration was in the habit of imparting Cabinet secrets. There can be no doubt that serious movements are on foot” (SDC p. 51).
On April 6, having ordered back in March an armed navel expedition to be ready to sail if needed, Lincoln ordered the ships to sail for Fort Sumter (SF p. 47; FWS p. 78).
On April 8, 1861, the United States Government informed the authorities at Charleston, South Carolina by messenger that they desired to send an unarmed supply ship to Fort Sumter, backed by force if needed. United States military vessels were reported off Charleston by April 10. Ignoring attempts to negotiate, Lincoln had backed the Confederacy into a corner. Feeling that Washington had not acted in good faith over Sumter, and fearing that the nearby Federal fleet would also enter the harbor, they signaled their intent to fire upon the supply ship should it enter the harbor, but the United States sent the ship anyway. In response to the presence of the ship, the Southern military in Charleston prepared to attack the Fort, having anticipated the use of force by the Federal fleet to send military reinforcements. On April 12, after a demand for surrender made to commanding officer Major Anderson was denied, Fort Sumter was fired upon. An article in the April 15, 1861, New York Tribune reported that “[t]he armed ships which accompanied the supplies took no part in the contest” (SDC p. 51-52; FWS p. 78; SF p. 47).
Not one man was killed on either side during the Southern bombardment of Fort Sumter. After surrendering, Major Anderson dined as a guest with Confederate commander General Beauregard (WEW p. 524).
While the attention of the South was on Fort Sumter, the Federal fleet succeeded in reinforcing Fort Pickens in Pensacola with men and supplies. It became clear that the entire episode at Charleston had been a diversion from the Federal intent to reinforce Fort Pickens. This plan had the additional benefit of provoking the South into firing the first shot and a inciting war fervor in the North, thus providing Lincoln with the political and popular cover he needed in order to use force against the South (SDC p. 50-51; WEW p. 524). The April 15 New York Post reported,
“Gen. Scott has been averse to the attempt to reinforce Fort Sumter. He saw that it would cost men and vessels which the Government could not spare just now […] He saw that the two keys of the position were Fort Pickens, in the Gulf, and Washington, the Capital. His plans, based on these facts, were at once laid […] Every hour the traitors spent before Sumter gave them more surely into the hands of the master. To make assurance doubly sure, he pretended to leave Fort Pickens in the lurch […] The Government said not a word–only asked of the traitors the opportunity to send its own garrison a needed supply of food. They refused, fearing the arrival of the Federal fleet […] Scarce had they begun [their attack], when they saw with evident terror, ships hovering about the harbor’s mouth; […] but no ships came in to Anderson’s help […] The position of affairs is this–Charleston is blockaded–Fort Pickens is reinforced by troops, which the traitors foolishly believed were destined for Sumter […] The traitors have, without the slightest cause, opened the war […]” (SDC p. 52-53).
Lincoln biographer, J. G. Holland, explained in his 1865 work, Life of Lincoln, why Lincoln did not call for armed force to suppress the secession of Southern States before the fall of Fort Sumter.
“Up to the fall of Sumter, Mr. Lincoln had no basis for action in the public feeling. If he had raised an army, that would have been an act of hostility, that would have been coercion. A thousand Northern presses would have pounced down on him as a provoker of war. After the fall of Sumter was the time to act” (GE p. 167).
On April 13, 1861, Lincoln called for 75,000 troops to be raised from State militias to march on those States which had seceded. Up until this time, the citizens of the border States had voted to remain in the Union. Practically overnight, Lincoln triggered a change of sentiments in the border States. In response to the Secretary of War regarding Virginia’s quota of troops, Governor Letcher replied,
“I have only to say that the militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern States and the requisition made upon me for such a object–an object in my judgment not within the purview of the constitution or the act of 1795, will not be complied with. You have chosen to inaugurate civil war; having done so we will meet you in a spirit as determined as the Administration has exhibited toward the South.”
In response to this action of the President, the Virginia Convention adopted an ordinance of secession on April 17, 1861, and sent it to the people of Virginia for ratification by a special vote set for April 23. (BBM p. 279-82; SF p. 51-52). The secession of Virginia was closely followed by Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina (WEW p. 512; CA p. 29, 38; FWS p. 82-83; SEM p. 611-12).
While largely Southern in sentiment, Kentucky and Missouri were divided, but did not secede. But Governor Magoffin responded to Lincoln’s call to arms, “Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern states.” Likewise, Governor Jackson of Missouri replied, “Your requisition is illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diabolical, and cannot be complied with” (CA p. 38; SF p. 53). In both states, however, secession conventions were held and each sent representatives to the Confederate Congress. (This accounts for the twelfth and thirteenth stars on the well-known Confederate battle flag.)
By defining the secession of the Southern States from the Union as a “rebellion,” Lincoln was able to justify mustering an army to quell the “insurrection” under the Act of Congress of 1795 which limited the use of the specially called militia to thirty days after the beginning of the next session of Congress. Lincoln delayed calling Congress into special session for at least two and a half months, thus prolonging his use of the militia against the South before he had to obtain congressional approval for his actions. By this time, Lincoln had set the machine of war into motion, and Congress was left to do little other than to appropriate funding for Lincoln’s plans (GLD p. 109-11; WEW p. 525; CA p. 41, 44, 121-22). This effectively preempted what Lincoln referred to in his inaugural address as the ability of the American people to “withhold the requisite means, or, in some authoritative manner” prevent his using force against the seceded States.
The great majority of Confederate soldiers owned no slaves. The 1860 United States census revealed that about 25% of white Southern families, or about 6% of the total white Southern population held slaves (WEW p. 529; JRK p. 83, 86).
The loyalty of free black Southerners and even slaves toward the Southern cause was counted on in some parts of the South. Along with their white counterparts, there were free blacks who were anxious to prove their bravery and patriotism against the invading Yankees (ELJ p. 219). Even though the use of black volunteers in the Confederate Army did not officially take place until the closing three months of the War (ELJ p. 246), black volunteers were often employed in state militias and local home guard units throughout the War (ELJ p. 219; CKB p. 8-10). These black Confederates were often awarded state pensions after the war based on their service to the Confederacy. Historian Ervin L. Jordan documents that in 1928 the State of Virginia awarded pensions to “black males who served on military details or performed guard duty on behalf of the Confederacy” (ELJ p. 226).
In June of 1861, Tennessee became the first State in the Confederacy to authorize the use of free black soldiers. Black soldiers between the ages of fifteen and fifty were paid $18 per month and received the same rations and clothing as white soldiers. By September of 1861 two regiments of black soldiers were in Memphis (ELJ p. 218-19).
On July 4, 1861, before a special session of what was left of the Congress, Lincoln rationalized his actions against the South as he said, “These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and public necessity, trusting then as now that Congress would readily ratify them” (GLD p, 111).
The legislature of Maryland was to convene on September 17, 1861. Beginning on the night of September 12, under orders of Secretary of War Simon Cameron, Major General Banks arrested all members of the legislature who were suspected of having Southern sympathies. These and other influential citizens were seized and imprisoned in Fort McHenry (CA p. 41). There were no charges against them of having committed overt acts of disloyalty or treason. They “appealed to Chief Justice [Roger Brooke] Taney who decided that they were held illegally, but they were not released. In this action of President Lincoln’s a most dangerous precedent was created. Through the acquiescence of Congress, then in session, the president had become a dictator” (WEW p. 525-26).
In November of 1861, elections were held in Maryland. Occupying soldiers of the Union Army voted in these elections, even though they were not citizens of Maryland. Soldiers were also stationed at the polls with bayonets affixed to their rifles. It was a foregone conclusion that only Union sympathizers would be elected. “The elections were a fraud, and finally the democratic system of government in Maryland breathed its last breath” (CA p. 41).
In 1861, John Hughes, Archbishop of New York, warned the U.S. War Department that his flock was “willing to fight to the death for the support of the constitution, the government, and the laws of the country, [but not] for the abolition of slavery” (SEM p. 666).
English author Charles Dickens, an avid student of the forces behind America’s War of 1861, and an opponent of slavery, made the following observation in an article entitled “American Disunion” in the December 21, 1861, issue of his London periodical, All the Year Round:
“The struggle between North and South has been of long duration. The South having the lead in the federation had fought some hard political battles to retain it… But in the last presidential election, which was a trial of strength between South and North, the South considering itself subject to the North within the federation, carried out its frequent threat and desire of secession” (CA p. 88).
Dickens biographer, Peter Ackroyd, reiterated Dickens’ view on the popular opinion regarding slavery and the war:
“The Northern onslaught upon slavery was no more than a piece of specious humbug designed to conceal its desire for economic control of the Southern states” (CA p. 89).
In his December 28, 1861, follow-up article, “The Morrill Tariff”, in his periodical All the Year Round, Dickens summarized his observations of the harmful effects of protectionist tariffs on the Southern economy being at the root of the North-South conflict:
“If it be not slavery, where lies the partition of the interests that has led at last to actual separation of the Southern from the Northern States? […] Every year, for some years back, this or that Southern state had declared that it would submit to this extortion only while it had not the strength for resistance. With the election of Lincoln and an exclusive Northern party taking over the federal government, the time for withdrawal had arrived […] The conflict is between semi-independent communities [in which] every feeling and interest [in the South] calls for political partition, and every pocket interest [in the North] calls for union […] [T]he quarrel between the North and South is, as it stands, solely a fiscal quarrel” (CA p. 90-91).
Union soldiers from New York on patrol out of Newport News, Virginia on December 22, 1861, were attacked by local Confederate forces near Newport Bridge. The attacking Confederate force was made up of cavalry and 700 armed blacks. Local Confederate fighting units were often formed during times of Union raids, and then were disbanded until needed again (ELJ p. 222).
Anthony Trollope, a British citizen traveling throughout the North and South early in the War observed, “The South is seceding from the North because the two are not homogeneous. They have different instincts, different appetites, different morals, and a different culture” (JRK p. 23).
In a message to Congress on March 6, 1862, Lincoln proposed compensation to the owners of slaves in any state–including those in the South–that would emancipate its slaves. This would have been consistent with how many of the slaves were freed in Northern States. Both Lincoln’s Cabinet and Congress rejected the proposal (WEW p. 543). However, Congress did pass an act abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. Lincoln signed the act on April 16, 1862. Owners were compensated up to $300 apiece for their liberated slaves (WEW p. 544; SDC p. 175).
To the surprise of many Yankee soldiers, many Southern blacks were not slaves. Knowing of the South only through stereotypes and often thinking that all Southern blacks were slaves, Yankee soldiers sometimes accused free blacks of hiding their masters, especially if the person’s home were nicely furnished. During such encounters, the Yankees would often steal the free black person’s food and belongings, and even destroy their homes (JRK p. 133-34).
The loyalty of Southern blacks in the presence of Yankee soldiers was varied. Some slaves went over to the Union troops, while others remained loyal to their white families (JRK p. 133-34). Rarely, though, did Southern blacks give Yankee soldiers their complete trust (ELJ p. 143).
Union soldiers reporting on the June, 1862 battle of Seven Pines claimed that two black Confederate regiments proved themselves ruthless opponents, showing no mercy to either dead or wounded Yankee soldiers (ELJ p. 223).
The wife of Union general Ulysses S. Grant, a slave owner herself, kept her slaves until the close of the War (WEW p. 518, 543).
In a letter dated August 22, 1862, to New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley, Lincoln said,
“My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union” (GE p. 218; SCV p. 5-6).
On August 25, 1862, Lincoln wrote a letter to Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune in which he again stated,
“If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone; I would also do that” (WEW p. 508).
During the battle of Antietam in September of 1862 fully armed black Confederate soldiers were observed as an integral part of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia (ELJ p. 223).
On September 24, 1862, Lincoln, having especially suffered the criticism of the Northern Democrats or “Copperheads” since he commenced hostilities against the South, suspended the writ of habeas corpus (the right to a speedy and public trial), a right guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. A Copperhead was a Northern Democrat who was critical of Lincoln’s war policies and his war against the South.
An estimated 20,000 to 38,000 political prisoners were incarcerated by Lincoln’s Provost Marshals, some of whom were sentenced before military tribunals, while others received no trial at all, never having known the charges against them (WEW p. 525; GLD p. 115-16; GE p. 7; CA p. 57).
Through the power of the military, Lincoln had newspapers shut down for coming out in direct opposition to his war time policies, or even if they merely raised questions. Ultimately over three hundred newspapers were closed. After enough public outrage, Lincoln simply had unfavorable newspaper editors imprisoned, leaving their positions to be filled by those who would support his policies (CA p.45-46, 58).
In December of 1862, Lincoln sought to alleviate the fears that emancipated slaves would come into the North and compete for the labor of white workers by assuring Congress that each State can “decide for itself whether to receive them” (JRK p. 55; BBM p. 173).
With the war losing its popularity in the North in 1862, the people of the North were not so willing to send their husbands and sons to die in “Mr. Lincoln’s war” to restore the Union, let alone for the emancipation of slaves (WEW p. 544).
It was not until well into the War that Lincoln began to link abolition of slavery with the War itself. He began to use the issue of slavery as a political tool to give the War a moral cause to help bolster Northern support, distance England and France from the South, solidify his support with the growing abolitionist movement, and possibly foster a slave revolt in the South. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863, issued under his war powers, declared only slaves in those States that seceded to be free. Those still enslaved in Northern or otherwise Union States (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri) were not freed by Lincoln’s proclamation since he knew he could not legally deprive United States citizens of their “property.” Exemptions from Lincoln’s proclamation included “the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. Johns, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans […] the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth,” much of Tennessee, the South Carolina coast, and any other areas of the Southern States under Union control. Not one slave was actually freed through Lincoln’s proclamation (WEW p. 545; SEM p. 654; ELJ p. 255; PMA p. 264-66).
Therefore, contrary to popular belief, Lincoln did not “free the slaves.” Emancipation of the slaves throughout the North and South was due to the ratification of the current Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by both the Northern and Southern States. Only in this way could an acknowledged internal matter of the States be constitutionally dealt with at the federal level–that is, with the States delegating authority that had been previously reserved by them. Constitutionally, this was not a matter for Lincoln and the Executive branch of the federal government.
During Congressional debate on January 8, 1863, Thadeous Stevens of Pennsylvania declared on the floor of Congress that the States of the Confederacy were a “belligerent nation” and no longer in the Union. As such, they were no longer entitled to the protections of the U. S. Constitution. Therefore, the taxes he proposed as Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee were to be levied upon “conquered provinces, just as all nations levy them upon provinces and nations they conquer.” He went on to say that he would “as a necessary war measure, take every particle of property, real and personal, life-estate and reversion, of every disloyal man, and sell it for the benefit of the nation in carrying on this war.” Stevens further stated that “this war must be carried on upon principle wholly independent of it [the Constitution]” and that the United States “must treat those States now outside of the Union as conquered provinces and settle them with new men, and drive the present rebels as exiles from this country […] They have such determination, energy, and endurance, that nothing but actual extermination or exile or starvation will ever induce them to surrender to this Government” (GLD p. 151; The Congressional Globe, January 8, 1863, p. 239-40, 243).
The Conscription Act of March 3, 1863, forced Northern men into service through a military draft. The draft was biased against the poor in that a man could pay $300 to commute his service for a particular draft. A man could also find a permanent substitute to serve in his place through a three year enlistment. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and the bringing in of black workers to break a dock workers’ strike brought Irish immigrants in New York City to the boiling point. The first drawing of names for the draft in the working-class quarters on July 13, 1863, sparked four days of riots in New York City. Blacks, having been blamed for the loss of jobs and the reason for the existence of the draft, were indiscriminately killed or beaten (SEM p. 666).
Northern States and cities were often officially and harshly rebuked by the Lincoln administration for not making their quota of recruits. Within the Confederacy, the Conscription Act of 1862 was enacted under the watchful eyes of the States. Within the Confederacy, federal legislation had to pass the muster of the high courts of the States. This oversight was exercised by these State high court judges who reserved the right to intercede on behalf of their citizens concerning actions of the federal government. Judge Moore of Texas, aware that conscription could be a tool of oppression in the hands of the federal government, concluded that “a necessity exists today, and the law is therefore constitutional, if tomorrow that necessity should cease, its continuance would be as clearly unconstitutional” (MLD p. 114-15). In practice, the Confederate States federal government recognized the preeminence of the sovereignty of a State in disputes where State and federal jurisdiction are in contest (MLD p.76).
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